

NCO-42-SF - FORCE PROTECTION (WATERSIDE) PLAN EXECUTION EXERCISE

PURPOSE

Evaluate ship's ability to execute a Force Protection Plan to counter a potential terrorist threat originating from the surrounding water while the ship is moored to a pier or a buoy or at anchor.

This exercise may be conducted in conjunction with NCO-41-SF, FORCE PROTECTION (WATERSIDE) EXERCISE, to create a more complete scenario.

This exercise should be conducted using TM SWDG 3-20.4-01, Surface Ship Force Protection in an Asymmetrical Environment.

REQUIREMENTS

A trusted agent cell, either the ship's own FP training team or an assist team from another command, which will plan and execute measures designed to test ship's FP posture during exercise.

PROCEDURES

OCE

1. Designate trusted agent cell. The cell should have the requisite expertise to conduct convincing measures to test exercise ship's FP posture during execution of exercise. Outside assistance from activities with FP knowledge should be exploited where available.

2. Establish an exercise vulnerability period. Minimum period is four hours. If desired, this may be planned for a longer period so that the exercise encompasses both daylight and nighttime periods.
3. If applicable, notify non-exercise ships in area of exercise period to minimize conflicts with exercise activity. If feasible, arrange to have ship moored in a location to minimize outside interference.
4. Evaluate exercise based on evaluation section below.

EXERCISE SHIP

1. Execute FP plan at start of exercise vulnerability period.

SAFETY

In conducting a scenario-based exercise of this type, imagination and ingenuity are important ingredients in making the exercise realistic and the training effective. However, the OCE and CO of the exercise ship must ensure that these efforts do not create potential safety problems. If the use of swimmers is planned, special safety considerations are necessary to prevent injury due to ship sea suction, movement of rudders, screws, management of overboard discharges, etc. In all cases the use of force will be simulated. Operational Risk Management will be used to evaluate intrusion plans to assure a safe environment is maintained.

EVALUATION

GENERAL

1. Was FP plan effectively executed?
2. If host nation support/liaison was part of the plan, was it conducted in an effective manner?
3. Were internal and external communications effective?
4. Were appropriate external reports made?

PERIMETER

1. Was ship's FP perimeter defined, demarcated and defended?
2. Did perimeter provide visual indication of limits to FP personnel?
3. Were tripwires established?

4. Was Force Protection Action Officer (FPAO) effective in coordinating FP maintenance of perimeter?
5. Were topside sentries manned by qualified ship's security watchstanders?
6. Were topside sentries fitted out with body armor, appropriate weapons, radios and whistles?
7. Were topside sentries well versed in warning procedures?
8. Were floating barriers, such as camels, logs or log booms, nets, etc., employed if available and part of plan?
9. Were the use of active sonar, movement of rudders and screws, and concussion grenades (Mk 3a2) employed or simulated?

SECURITY BOAT PROCEDURES

1. Were security boats employed?
2. Were at least two security force personnel assigned to each boat, in addition to the normal boat crew, for visual coverage, FP force communications, warnings and use of force actions?
3. Were coxswains trained in close quarter conning ability, including shouldering and blocking tactics?
4. Were drag lines from boats used as an anti-swimmer tactic?
5. Were sufficient boats employed to provide overlapping coverage consistent with the amount of waterside access to the ship and the amount of small boat traffic in the area?
6. Were communications maintained with other boats and with the ship?
7. Were boat crew reliefs staggered to prevent gaps in coverage.

SEARCH PROCEDURES

1. Was a central search/inspection point pierside set up at a location outside the minimum standoff zone but within visual range of topside personnel in order to inspect/search vessels planned to come alongside (port service craft, ship chandler craft, etc.)?
2. If pierside inspections are not possible, were "point of origin" searches or waterborne searches for these vessels conducted?
3. Were communication maintained with the ship from the search location?
4. Were search procedures effective?

WARNING PROCEDURES

1. Were radio, amplified voice, lights and/or flares used to warn surface craft?
2. Did second warnings include statement that failure to comply will result in employment of defensive measures?

WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

1. Were all personnel PQS qualified on weapons carried?
2. Were all personnel carrying weapons trained in the use of deadly force?
3. Were small arms deployed in an effective manner; i.e., appropriate for threat direction, overlapping fields of fire and 360 degree protection?
4. Were all personnel carrying weapons familiar with the types of fire to be employed and tactics for engaging vehicles and personnel?
5. In the event of an attack, were personnel alert to the possibility of a second attack from a different axis?
6. Were crew-served weapons on ship included in plan?
7. Were use-of-force plans coordinated with local authorities?

USE OF LIGHTING

1. Was deck edge lighting employed?
2. If moored to pier, was lighting used to illuminate area under the pier?

NON-LETHAL METHODS

1. Was use made of non-lethal methods, where appropriate?